

Public Health Perspective: CRE and ESBL-E

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• The findings and conclusions in this presentation are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

Estimated CRE and ESBL-E cases among U.S. hospitalized patients

	Threat Level	2017-2019 Change	2019-2020 Change	2020 Estimate
CRE	Urgent	Decreased 🖊	Overall: Stable Hospital-onset: 35% 1	12,700 cases 1,100 deaths
ESBL-E	Serious	Increased 1	Overall: 10% 1 Hospital-onset: 32% 1	197,500 cases 9,300 deaths

CRE: carbapenem-resistant Enterobacterales; ESBL-E: extended spectrum β -lactamase producing Enterobacterales

https://www.cdc.gov/drugresistance/pdf/covid19-impact-report-508.pdf

Distinct features between CRE and ESBL-E

	CRE		ESBL-E
•	Emerging	•	Endemic
•	Primarily healthcare- associated	•	Healthcare and community- associated
•	Resistant to commonly used antibiotics	•	Can treat with carbapenems

CRE: carbapenem-resistant Enterobacterales; ESBL-E: extended spectrum β-lactamase producing Enterobacterales

Plasmid-mediated resistance contributes to rapid spread and multidrug resistance

• Multiple mechanisms of CRE resistance:

- Chromosomal mutations, upregulation of intrinsic mechanisms
- Carbapenemase production (acquisition of mobile plasmids containing genes encoding carbapenemase): KPC, NDM, IMP, VIM, OXA-48-like

• ESBLs often encoded by genes on plasmids

- CTX-M most common worldwide
- Plasmids can carry genes for **resistance to other antimicrobial agents**

KPC-producing CRE spread across US in less than two decades

- 35% of CRE in US are carbapenemase-producers (CP)
- 77% of CP-CRE in US are KPC



https://arpsp.cdc.gov/profile/antibiotic-resistance/carbapenem-resistant-enterobacterales Patel JB et al. Clin Micro Newsletter 2009;31:8.

Emerging Infections Program

 Multisite Gram-negative Surveillance Initiative
 (MuGSI)

National Healthcare Safety Network

- Device-associated and surgical site infection
- Antimicrobial Resistance

 (AR)
 (AR)

Domestic

AR Laboratory Network

 Public health laboratories in all 50 US states, several large cities, and territories (CRE only)

CDC surveillance for CRE and ESBL-E

International

Global AR Lab & Response Network Collaborations

 Antimicrobial Resistance in Communities and Hospitals (ARCH)

Combining prevention and response strategies



Figure 1. Relationship between epidemic stages, response tiers, containment response, and prevention activities for Interim Guidance for a Public Health novel or targeted MDROs. Limited Moderate No Advanced Endemicity Cases Spread Spread Spread Tier 1* Tier 2[^] Tier 3 Tier 4 Containment Prevention Organism or resistant mechanism that have *Never (or very rarely) been identified in the United States and for which experience is extremely limited are Tier 1. [^]Never (or very rarely) been identified in a public health jurisdisction but are more common in other parts of the U.S. are Tier 2.



https://www.cdc.gov/hai/mdro-guides/prevention-strategy.html

Prevention Strategies

- Intended to reduce MDRO transmission at all stages of spread
- Encompasses ongoing interventions

https://www.cdc.gov/hai/mdro-guides/containment-strategy.html

Containment Strategy

- Intended for **pre-endemic** stage
- **Time-limited**, implemented • following identification of novel or targeted MDRO
- Layered on existing prevention • interventions

Resources

- <u>https://www.cdc.gov/hai/organisms/cre/index.html</u>
- https://www.cdc.gov/hai/organisms/ESBL.html
- https://www.cdc.gov/hai/eip/mugsi.html
- https://www.cdc.gov/hai/mdro-guides/index.html

Thank You

For more information, contact CDC 1-800-CDC-INFO (232-4636) TTY: 1-888-232-6348 www.cdc.gov

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